USD sẽ mất giá đến mức nào

Nguyễn Xuân Sơn
(NguyenXuanSon)

New Member
hồi châu ÂU mới chuyển sang EURO, bọn tôi đau đớn nhìn 20% ngân khoản của bản thân biến mất vì tỉ giá USD Eur thay đổi theo chiều hướng có lợi cho USD.
Bầy giờ thì ngược lại, từ cả năm nay EUR luôn tăng giá.
Có người thì thầm vào tai tôi là thực ra USD còn phải xuống nữa , đến cả 20 % hoặc hơn (về lâu dài, nghĩa là 10 năm nữa), nghe mà giật mình.
Vào đây mạo muội hỏi các đại gia là các đại gia nghĩ gì và cho lơi khuyên nên tích trữ tiền gì cho an toàn cái :)
Xuân Sơn
 
Liên quan đến vấn đề tỉ giá đồng tiền so với quốc gia. Xin các bạn thử trao đổi và thử trả lời một cách đầy đủ ý nghĩa của câu hỏi sau:

- Đồng tiền quốc nội (domestic currency) tăng giá (giảm giá) so với US dollar là có lợi hay có hại?

Hay đơn giản như ví dụ sau: Nhìn vào tình hình US dollar lạm phát như dạo này, thì nước Mỹ là đang tốt hay xấu?
 
Hôm nay đọc lại bài này:
1/ USD vẫn tiếp tục mất giá một thời gian nữa :)
2/ việc này có cái lợi là nếu đi chơi US thì thoài mái hơn và nếu có bạn từ SINGAPOR hay US sang chơi thì nhờ mua đồ cũng rất sướng. Tự nhiên bác mua được cái màn hình máy tính LCD 19 inch với giá rẻ bác có sướng không?
Xuân Sơn
 
Bất lợi:

Tin tức Việt Nam đã viết:
Đời sống sinh viên Việt tại Anh "tụt dốc" theo USD

....

Việc làm đầu tiên trong ngày của Thủy (Hull University) khi tay chạm vào máy tính là “tra tỷ giá đô la/bảng Anh”. Thủy không phải “dân” kinh tế, việc Thủy làm cũng đã là “chuyện thường ngày ở huyện” đối với gần 100 SV Việt Nam (VN) theo diện học bổng Ngân sách Nhà nước (Đề án 322) ở United Kingdom.

....

Từ hơn hai năm nay, đồng USD liên tục bị mất giá, khiến cho đời sống của LHS Đề án 322, đặc biệt là LHS ở Anh rơi vào tình trạng cực kỳ khốn khó. Năm 2001, mức sinh hoạt phí 780 USD Nhà nước cấp cho mỗi LHS hàng tháng quy đổi được 560 bảng Anh (GBP), đến năm 2002 chỉ còn được khoảng 500 bảng, năm 2003 là 470, và đầu năm 2004 là 430 bảng Anh.

.....

Tháng 7/2004, Thủy và nhiều SV khác nhận được mức học bổng 421 GBP (qui đổi từ 780 USD). So với tốp nhận học bổng trước đó 2 tháng với mức 430 GBP thì đã là “thiệt thòi” lắm, nhưng so với Tố Loan (ĐH Leeds), Đức Thắng (ĐH Birmingham)… nhận sinh hoạt phí đợt tháng 10 với mức 412 GPB, Thủy còn may mắn chán. Và đến tháng 12/2004, tốp LHS nhập học tháng 9/2004 như Phúc (ĐH học Leeds), Cường (ĐH Nottingham), Hương (ĐH Bournemouth)…, chỉ còn nhận được 390 GBP với vài xu lẻ.

Số tiền này chỉ bằng 70% so với số sinh hoạt phí mà LHS VN khoá đầu tiên (năm 2001) được hưởng, trong khi vật giá sinh hoạt ở Anh đã lũy tiến hơn 15% so với mức giá năm 2001.

http://www1.tintucvietnam.com/Du-Hoc/2004/12/84237.ttvn
 
Đúng là những Lưu học sinh đi học nước ngoài nhận học bổng bằng usd thì thiệt thòi thật. Học bổng đã thấp mà tièn usd ngày càng mất giá. Nhưng mà biết làm sao được, phải khắc phục hoàn cảnh thôi.
 
Usd mất giá, tiền địa phương thì lại tăng, cái gì cũng trở nên đắt một cách kinh khủng,chẳng dám mua sắm gì cả; tiền học cũng tăng.Buồn quá đi mất... :((
 
Em nghĩ 1 phần cũng do bọn Mỹ nó muốn thúc đẩy xuất khẩu để bù vào cái BIG deficit trong Balance of Payment nữa. Còn chuyện $ có mất giá thật không thì cũng tùy thuộc vào từng currency khác nhau, ví dụ như bọn Trung Quốc chẳng hạn, thì khéo khi $ là overvalued so với nhân dân tệ í chứ, cứ nhìn hàng Tàu ở bên này thì biết :)
 
Tớ kiếm được bài trên Time số tuần vừa rồi này

Wither The Dollar
A weak dollar should be good for U.S. exports. But it's already causing pain overseas, and in the long run it could drive up the cost of living at home
By DANIEL KADLEC

TIME Dec. 20, 2004
At Baldor Electric, which is based in Fort Smith, Ark., but sells its industrial motors around the world, these are flush times. After several sluggish years, profit margins are expanding again, revenue is soaring, and earnings will rise 30% this year. Its sales in 70 countries are booming — from Canada to Germany to China. "Our international business is up almost double our domestic business," says CEO John McFarland.
Yet things are very different for manufacturers based in some of the same countries where Baldor is doing so well. Weinig Gruppe, a midsize machinery maker near the city of Wurg, Germany, has resorted to discounts to protect its global market share. Sales growth is stalling; profit margins are shriveling. Even with incentives, says CEO Rainer Hundsdorfer, "we've seen a slight decrease in business. Prices have to give."


This tale of two companies has little to do with what either one makes or how well each makes it and, far from being isolated cases, their plights echo through the boardrooms of thousands of big and small companies around the world. Success these days is determined in part by something no company can control: the value of the U.S. dollar — the world's most trusted currency, which has been melting away for three years. Currency moves are a normal part of global trade. Their impact generally is best left for financial geeks and really bored people to ponder. But not now. The dollar's long slide — and widespread expectations that it will slip further — has officials on three continents fearing that their economies are stretched to the breaking point. They're assigning plenty of blame anywhere but their own backyard, and the accountability void only deepens worries of a dollar-induced global-domino recession.

Is the falling dollar really such a big deal? Since 2001, it is down 33% against the euro and 20% against the Japanese yen and has weakened against the pound and Canadian dollar as well. This broad slide has made goods produced in the U.S. more affordable to foreigners with stronger currencies. In the short run, foreign buying is a boon to U.S. factories that only now are emerging from their worst rut since the Great Depression. In fact, though U.S. officials say they want a strong dollar, the open secret in Washington is that they are in no rush to make it happen. For one thing, the steps the U.S. must take to shore up the buck are painful, probably involving some combination of tax hikes and budget cuts to rein in the U.S.'s massive borrowing needs. The federal budget deficit tops $400 billion, and tallying all forms of money flowing in and out of the nation, the country's total accounts deficit will come to about $665 billion this year, or a record 5.7% of GDP. President George W. Bush has said he wants to cut that deficit. Again, few believe he will take measurable steps until he has run out of options, because his plans for private Social Security accounts and making tax cuts permanent would require money the government doesn't have.

Besides, the weak dollar is a big factor in the revived manufacturing sector. After some lean years, exports are picking up, and factory profits are on a roll. In the third quarter alone, equipment maker Caterpillar attributed $102 million of sales largely to the benefits of a falling dollar. General Motors is opening new Cadillac dealerships in Europe. "The drop in the value of the dollar certainly helps," says James Taylor, Cadillac manager in Detroit. Other U.S. multinationals are reaping windfalls too, converting overseas revenues into the weak dollar and getting more of them.

That is all good stuff, for now. But over the long haul, a banana-republic dollar could lead to inflation, higher interest rates and a recession likely to spill around the planet. In the past, the strong dollar allowed the U.S. government to borrow cheaply and attract investment in the safest currency on the globe. That helped finance the budget deficit, kept interest rates low and also allowed Americans, as individuals and collectively through their government, to spend way beyond their means. Foreigners are big buyers of mortgage securities, which make purchasing that McMansion more affordable. They hold nearly $2 trillion of Treasury securities, keeping government costs low enough to allow the President to consider his new initiatives. But foreigners may be reaching their saturation point when it comes to funding the U.S.'s profligate lifestyle. The nation sucks up 80% of the world's available savings. If the dollar loses its cachet, foreigners will demand higher interest rates, which, if they rise fast or far enough, could topple the economy.

European Pain
Americans traveling in Europe, where their dollars don't go very far, are feeling some pain. While vacationing in Paris last week, university professor Maria Armanda was surprised to find "a bottle of Coca-Cola outside the bus stop was $2.60. That's unheard of! I needed the caffeine, or I wouldn't have bought it." Trina Chang, a Californian backpacking through Europe, says, "We were going to buy two oranges this morning, but they cost so much, we put them back. It's so expensive, it's so sad." More important, the cost of foreign goods in the U.S. is increasing. Consider: at import-foods shop A Southern Season in Chapel Hill, N.C., a pound of European Brie has shot from $6.99 to $8.29 in a year, and even at that price, the store makes less profit. "We try to educate our staff" about the dollar impact so they can explain the prices to angry customers, says manager Briggs Wesche. And it's not just cheese and other luxury imports: every American buys foreign goods, from TVs to food to clothes — often without knowing it — and many of those things will cost more too.

Hardest hit around the globe are the Europeans, whose exports are being squeezed by the cheap dollar and equally cheap Chinese yuan, which, to the dismay of global leaders, remains pegged at 8.3 yuan to the dollar. China has a large and growing trade surplus with the U.S., and American and European officials argue that the cheap currency gives the Chinese an unfair advantage. Some Europeans are taking advantage of the robust euro to come to the U.S., where everything from iPods to Gap jeans to four-star-hotel stays are suddenly a bargain. (Bookings are up 30% at Germany's largest tour company, TUI, which has been able to cut trip prices as much as 26%.) But euro-land companies are suffering. Exports from Germany to the U.S. are down 10%. Thierry Desmarest, CEO of French oil giant Total, says the dollar's move over the past two years means "we have practically lost one-third of our earnings." Bic, the French firm that makes disposable shavers, says the weak buck has shaved 75% off its sales growth.

Asia's Dollar Horde
Asians are dismayed too, but for different reasons. They are by far the biggest holders of U.S. debt, led by Japan's breathtaking Treasury holdings of $720 billion, followed by China with $174 billion. These sums have been building for years, as Asians, who sell far more goods in the U.S. than the U.S. sells in Asia, have taken their profits and invested in Treasury bonds — all of which are losing value as the dollar slips. At this point, Asians have little choice but to hold on and take their lumps, and not just because the large-scale dumping of dollars would crush the value of their remaining holdings. Shifting out of dollars could also be dangerous for the global economy, pushing the beleaguered currency even lower and triggering sharply higher interest rates in the U.S. That in turn would slow the U.S. economy and depress demand for all those imported goods, potentially triggering a worldwide recession.

Fear of that outcome probably is overblown. Foreign officials understand that the effects of dumping dollars would circle back and cripple their economies. In an interview with TIME, Masatsugu Asakawa, a top Japan Ministry of Finance official, said flatly there will be no dollar dumping. "Our foreign-reserve planning is in terms of 100 years," he said. Holding dollars, "sometimes we enjoy profit. Sometimes we suffer loss. So what?" The point is, it gives Japan flexibility. "Who knows when we might have to intervene to support the yen" after years of supporting the dollar? he asks.

Still, few U.S. economists feel comfortable that the fate of the economy sits largely in the hands of its creditors, especially when all parties are playing an international blame game. Europeans want the U.S. to cut the deficit; the U.S. wants Europe to stop whining and stimulate its economy, which would generate domestic demand and offset business lost to the U.S. and China because the weak dollar has made European goods so much more expensive. Both European and U.S. officials want China to revalue its yuan. With a hot economy and trade surplus, the Chinese, many Westerners believe, can handle a stronger currency, and there are signs that they will go along. The cheap yuan has begun to translate into higher inflation in China. A stronger currency would relieve some of that pressure. And two weeks ago, officials from the Chinese central bank met in the city of Guilin and asked "a lot of questions about what would happen if they ended the dollar peg and instead pegged the yuan to a basket of currencies," says a foreign banker who attended. "I hadn't heard those questions before."

That's a good sign. In this delicate balance, if the Japanese hold their dollars, if the Chinese let the yuan rise even a little and suggest they are willing to go further, if Europe does something to jump-start demand at home, and if the U.S. addresses its budget shortfall — well, we may just escape this jam without a scratch. That's a lot of ifs. But, thankfully, everyone has something at stake.
 
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Em cũng xin đóng góp hai bài trên tờ the economist, đây là bài nói về nguyên nhân mất giá của đồng đô la:

Economics focus

Checking the depth gauge
Nov 11th 2004
From The Economist print edition


How low might the dollar sink?







AS THE dollar hit another new low against the euro, briefly breaching $1.30 on November 10th, an increasing number of economists are asking how far the greenback might fall and how its slide will affect the world economy. One of the most alarming answers comes from Paul Volcker, Alan Greenspan's immediate predecessor as chairman of the Federal Reserve. He recently said that he thought there was a 75% chance of a currency crisis in the United States within five years.

It is easy to see how this might happen. America's current-account deficit is running at a record 6% of GDP this year, and on existing policies it will continue to widen. America's net foreign liabilities are already 23% of GDP, and economists at Goldman Sachs calculate that this figure will reach more than 60% by 2020, even if the current-account deficit stabilises at 5% of GDP (see chart). Other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, have sustained large external deficits for long periods, but America's borrowing is much bigger in absolute terms. It is eating up around 75% of the excess saving of Japan, China, Germany and other countries with current-account surpluses. If the dollar did not have the advantage of being the world's main reserve currency, America would already be in serious trouble. Instead, the willingness of Asian central banks to lend to the United States has allowed its deficit to keep growing for longer. Nevertheless, the deficit is unsustainable: sooner or later it will need to shrink, and that will involve a cheaper dollar.


A new paper* by Maurice Obstfeld, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, and Kenneth Rogoff, of Harvard, a former head of research at the International Monetary Fund, predicts that the dollar will fall by another 20% in real trade-weighted terms even if America's external deficit unwinds gradually. If the adjustment is more abrupt, the dollar will dive by more than 40%.

Many economists try to estimate how much the dollar needs to fall in order to eliminate or at least to reduce the current-account deficit. But Mr Obstfeld and Mr Rogoff argue that such analysis is flawed. America's current-account deficit reflects inadequate domestic saving. Cutting it therefore requires that American saving rises or that demand in the rest of the world increases. A fall in the dollar would be a by-product of this adjustment. But without an increase in saving, even a big fall in the dollar would make only a small dent in America's current-account deficit.

The two economists assume that the current-account deficit shrinks as a result either of increased saving by American households (because, for instance, the country's house-price boom ends) or of a strengthening of demand in Asia and Europe. Then, using a model of the global economy, they focus on the changes in relative prices of traded and non-traded goods needed to ensure that demand matches supply in domestic product markets as the current-account deficit narrows.

According to conventional wisdom, a weaker dollar reduces the trade deficit by boosting American exports. That is true, but Mr Obstfeld and Mr Rogoff argue that the main pressure for a fall in the dollar comes instead from the need to encourage Americans to consume fewer traded goods (ie, both imports and goods that could be exported) and to buy more non-traded goods and services. If the current-account deficit is reduced through an increase in household saving, spending on non-traded as well as traded goods will drop. To maintain equilibrium in domestic markets and to prevent a rise in unemployment, the consumption of non-traded goods needs to rise relative to that of traded goods. This in turn requires a decrease in the relative price of non-traded goods. This means that the dollar's real exchange rate must fall.

From this way of viewing the likely fall in the dollar, the substitution of American for foreign traded goods is less important than of non-traded for traded goods. But because traded goods account for only around 25% of America's GDP, the current-account deficit of 5-6% of GDP amounts to an enormous 20-25% of traded-goods production. Thus closing the external deficit while maintaining domestic equilibrium requires a big change in the relative price of non-traded versus traded goods, and therefore in the exchange rate.



An echo of the seventies?
The real question is not whether the dollar needs to fall, but how drastic the economic effects of its fall will be. In the mid-1980s, the greenback's trade-weighted value declined by 40% with few ill-effects in America. The world economy absorbed the shock reasonably well. Unfortunately, the authors see more parallels today with the dollar's collapse in the 1970s, when the Bretton Woods system broke down. Like today, that was a time of large budget deficits, loose monetary policy and rising oil prices, and America faced open-ended costs to pay for a war. Today, the combined costs of fighting in Iraq and maintaining security at home could easily match the cumulative 12% of GDP that the Vietnam war cost. There is therefore a risk that the global economic consequences might be as severe as those which followed the demise of Bretton Woods, with higher interest rates and a drop in global output.

If Mr Obstfeld's and Mr Rogoff's gloomier prediction turns out to be correct and the dollar falls by 40% or more, then this would, in effect, amount to the biggest “default” in history. This would not, of course, be a conventional failure to service debt, but could be viewed as default by stealth. America borrows from others largely in its own currency, so by letting the dollar drop it would wipe trillions off the value of foreigners' dollar assets. In such circumstances, the risk of a financial crisis is not negligible. As Mr Rogoff puts it: “The world is set to jump off the top of a waterfall without knowing how deep the water is below.”
 
Và đây là bài viết về những hậu quả xấu do sự mất giá của đồng đô la:

World economy
The disappearing dollar
Dec 2nd 2004
From The Economist print edition


How long can it remain the world's most important reserve currency?

THE dollar has been the leading international currency for as long as most people can remember. But its dominant role can no longer be taken for granted. If America keeps on spending and borrowing at its present pace, the dollar will eventually lose its mighty status in international finance. And that would hurt: the privilege of being able to print the world's reserve currency, a privilege which is now at risk, allows America to borrow cheaply, and thus to spend much more than it earns, on far better terms than are available to others. Imagine you could write cheques that were accepted as payment but never cashed. That is what it amounts to. If you had been granted that ability, you might take care to hang on to it. America is taking no such care, and may come to regret it.



The cost of neglect
The dollar is not what it used to be. Over the past three years it has fallen by 35% against the euro and by 24% against the yen. But its latest slide is merely a symptom of a worse malaise: the global financial system is under great strain. America has habits that are inappropriate, to say the least, for the guardian of the world's main reserve currency: rampant government borrowing, furious consumer spending and a current-account deficit big enough to have bankrupted any other country some time ago. This makes a dollar devaluation inevitable, not least because it becomes a seemingly attractive option for the leaders of a heavily indebted America. Policymakers now seem to be talking the dollar down. Yet this is a dangerous game. Why would anybody want to invest in a currency that will almost certainly depreciate?


A second disturbing feature of the global financial system is that it has become a giant money press as America's easy-money policy has spilled beyond its borders. Total global liquidity is growing faster in real terms than ever before. Emerging economies that try to fix their currencies against the dollar, notably in Asia, have been forced to amplify the Fed's super-loose monetary policy: when central banks buy dollars to hold down their currencies, they print local money to do so. This gush of global liquidity has not pushed up inflation. Instead it has flowed into share prices and houses around the world, inflating a series of asset-price bubbles.

America's current-account deficit is at the heart of these global concerns. The OECD's latest Economic Outlook predicts that the deficit will rise to $825 billion by 2006 (6.4% of America's GDP) assuming unchanged exchange rates. Optimists argue that foreigners will keep financing the deficit because American assets offer high returns and a haven from risk. In fact, private investors have already turned away from dollar assets: the returns on investments in America have recently been lower than in Europe or Japan (see article). And can a currency that has been sliding against the world's next two biggest currencies for 30 years be regarded as “safe”?

In a free market, without the massive support of Asian central banks, the dollar would be far weaker. In any case, such support has its limits, and the dollar now seems likely to fall further. How harmful will the economic consequences be? Will it really undermine the dollar's reserve-currency status?

Periods of dollar decline have often been unhappy for the world economy. The breakdown of Bretton Woods that led to a weaker dollar in the early 1970s was painful for all, contributing to rising inflation and recession. In the late 1980s, the falling dollar had few ill-effects on America's economy, but it played a big role in inflating a bubble in Japan by forcing Japanese authorities to slash interest rates.

This time round, it is a bad sign that everybody is trying to point the finger of blame at somebody else. America says its external deficit is mainly due to sluggish growth in Europe and Japan, and to the fact that China is pegging its exchange rate too low. Europe, alarmed at the “brutal” rise in the euro, says that America's high public borrowing and low household saving are the real culprits.

There is something to both these claims. China and other Asian economies should indeed let their currencies rise, relieving pressure on the euro. It is also true that Asia is partly to blame for America's consumer binge: its central banks' large purchases of Treasury bonds have depressed bond yields, encouraging households in the United States to take out bigger mortgages and spend the cash. And Europe needs to accept, as it is unwilling to, that a weaker dollar will be a good thing if it helps to shrink America's deficit and curb the risk of a future crisis. At the same time, Europe is also right: most of the blame for America's deficit lies at home. America needs to cut its budget deficit. It is not a question of either do this or do that: a cheaper dollar and higher American saving are both needed if a crunch is to be avoided.



Simple but harsh
Many American policymakers talk as though it is better to rely entirely on a falling dollar to solve, somehow, all their problems. Conceivably, it could happen—but such a one-sided remedy would most likely be far more painful than they imagine. America's challenge is not just to reduce its current-account deficit to a level which foreigners are happy to finance by buying more dollar assets, but also to persuade existing foreign creditors to hang on to their vast stock of dollar assets, estimated at almost $11 trillion. A fall in the dollar sufficient to close the current-account deficit might destroy its safe-haven status. If the dollar falls by another 30%, as some predict, it would amount to the biggest default in history: not a conventional default on debt service, but default by stealth, wiping trillions off the value of foreigners' dollar assets.

The dollar's loss of reserve-currency status would lead America's creditors to start cashing those cheques—and what an awful lot of cheques there are to cash. As that process gathered pace, the dollar could tumble further and further. American bond yields (long-term interest rates) would soar, quite likely causing a deep recession. Americans who favour a weak dollar should be careful what they wish for. Cutting the budget deficit looks cheap at the price
 
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