Em đang học lớp China nên có viết 1 cái paper về Sino _ Vietnamese War
Khi nào có thời gian em sẽ dịch sang tiếng Việt.
Hung Le Viet Ho
CORE 165 B: China in Transformation
The Sino – Vietnamese Conflict: Causes and Consequences
One of the wars in the twentieth century that is little discussed today is China’s seventeen-day invasion into Vietnam in February 1979. Rarely mentioned by both Vietnam and China since the normalization of their relations in 1989, this short conflict in fact involved a high number of force and casualties in both sides. The attack started on February 27, beginning along the entire length of the border, but was directed mainly toward three provincial capitals – Lang Son, Cao Bang and Lao Cai. Through twenty-six points along the border line, 85,000 Chinese troops surged across the frontier in human-wave attacks like those China had used in Korea three decades before. A force of up to 180,000 Chinese troops was used in the initial attack, but rising to 230,000 later. After several weeks of bitter fighting, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) suffered severe losses. Up until now, it is still not clear whether China or Vietnam was the winner in this short conflict, since both sides claimed that they were. Also, the origins of this war are still ambiguous, although China stated that her act was to punish Vietnam for invading China’s ally Cambodia as Deng Xiaoping said in his meeting with Japan’s Prime Minister Ohira on February 7: “Vietnam must be punished for its expansionist action against Cambodia … action which has been instigated by the Soviet Union.” In reality, the motivations behind China’s seemingly reckless decision to attack Vietnam, providing the fact that Vietnam and Soviet were close allies at that time, were much more complicated. This paper mainly focuses on analyzing the causes and consequences of the conflict.
Although both China and Vietnam are communist countries, their relationship has never been peaceful especially since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. One of their major disputes has always been over territorial issues. China and Vietnam share approximately 700 miles of common border, and this border was delineated by Sino-French treaties signed during the colonial period. Since 1974, along the Sino – Vietnamese land border, the steady increase in incidents had seriously deteriorated the relationship between two countries. Although several meetings have been held, there were still a huge difference between Hanoi and Beijing. Moreover, it is probable that China did not even intend to resolve the disputes over the borderline. Although those incidents did increase the tension between Beijing and Hanoi, they were not imminent threat to Vietnamese security. However, the incidents got more serious, on August 25, an incident occurred at the Friendship Pass. Hanoi maintained that Chinese soldiers entered Vietnamese territory to attack Vietnamese border officials, while Beijing alleged that two hundred Vietnamese soldiers herded two thousand Chinese refugees across the border, killed four Chinese citizens. Later in October, the Chinese Foreign Ministry “lodged a strong protest” against Vietnamese encroachment on Chinese territory, declaring that the PRC “solemnly demands” that Hanoi “stop at once all of its acts of encroachments. The Vietnamese authorities must shoulder all responsibility and the consequences arising from” their violation of Chinese territory. The border disputes have become a serious source of friction and it seemed that the incidents had gone far more than only a dispute of “several scores of square kilometers” as in the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua. In addition to border disputes, Vietnam and China also had disagreements over the control of the Paracels and Spratly Islands in the Gulf of Tonkin area between the seacoast of North Vietnam and China’s Hainan Island. These islands play important roles for both countries since the South China Sea has been famous for its richness of oil.
Nevertheless, the Chinese concern for Vietnamese border policy, although seemed adequate for an attack, was indeed not the real cause of its invasion of Vietnam. China, in fact, did not have a powerful reason to go to war over the border with Vietnam. Although in 1962, it did initiate a border war with India, but it was only after India occupying a large area of Chinese territory. Vietnam was, however, never accused of similar actions; instead China’s most serious charge was its “nibbling” at Chinese territory. Moreover, unlike the Indian case, there was no evidence that Hanoi was on the offensive. In fact, China might have initiated many clashes, as it wanted to “present Vietnam with a two-front war if Vietnam ever decided to invade Cambodia.” Also, considering the fact that Moscow and Hanoi had just signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in November 1978, a war in response to an ambiguous border conflict over small amounts of strategically insignificant territory would be very risky for China. In fact, given the large size of China’s territory, Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian has said publicly that it would not be a great deal for China to give up to Vietnam the total of 60 sq. kms which it regards as in dispute. Therefore, it is very unlikely that China invaded Vietnam because Hanoi violated Chinese territorial integrity. Yet these incidents did seriously deteriorate the relationship between two countries and contributed to China’s decision to start the war.
Another crisis that was linked to China’s decision to start the war is the treatment of overseas Chinese (Hoa people) in Vietnam. In 1978, there were as many as 1.5 million overseas Chinese in Vietnam, of which 300,000 lived in North Vietnam. In North Vietnam, most of them worked as coal miners, factory workers, and fishermen. They were placed under Vietnam’s jurisdiction without any serious problems from the Chinese government. However, in the South, it was a different matter. The overseas Chinese in southern Vietnam constituted a formidable economic force, as they practically controlled most important aspects of the South Vietnamese economy, especially production, manufacture and distribution of essential commodities. In order to engage in trade, most overseas Chinese changed their citizenship to Vietnamese under the South Vietnam’s regime. When the communists took over the South, the Vietnamese authorities claimed that the Chinese in South Vietnam were “no longer Chinese residents, but Vietnamese of Chinese origins.” The Chinese government had never accepted the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government, and therefore insisted that measures taken under his regime were invalid.
The control of overseas Chinese over the South Vietnam’s economy has always been a source of irritation for the Vietnamese government, as they identify them one of the prime reasons for the country’s economy failure. Hanoi was eager to abolish capitalist in the South by “shifting bourgeois tradesmen to production” to ensure firmer state control over the economy and “accelerate the socialist transformation of private capitalist industry and commerce in the South.” Also, given Beijing’s claim over the invalidity of Hanoi’s jurisdiction of overseas Chinese in the South, Hanoi wanted to assert stronger control over the ethnic Chinese, whose loyalty was in doubt and who might be open to the manipulation by Beijing. China’s position was, however, conditioned by the hope that “the overseas Chinese would play an important part in the economy and send remittances back to their relatives in China.” Hanoi clearly did not share Beijing’s perspective. Three years after liberation, the South Vietnamese economy was still “plagued with inflation, speculation, hoarding, faked commodities, and the inability of the state-operated trade sector to compete effectively with the private sector.” On March 23, Hanoi announced, “effective immediately,” the end of private trade and business in southern Vietnam. In a later violent operation until mid-April 1978, it decided to carry out tough measures including confiscating more than thirty thousand private businesses in the South, seizing private properties and personal savings, currency exchange and ordering the traders, predominantly ethnic Chinese to move to the new economic zone where they became farmers in an undeveloped part of the Vietnamese countryside or be conscripted into the army. Overnight, hundreds of thousands of Chinese were deprived of their livelihood. The clamp down triggered a mass “exodus” of overseas Chinese. Most of them decided to escape by sea – at least a hundred thousand of boat people have been picked up by neighboring countries; 85 percent of these refugees were ethnic Chinese. Many other people were not that fortunate; they lost their lives in the South China Sea. The departure of Chinese people in the South also caused widespread panic among the Chinese people in the North. According to Chinese sources, from early April, just after the elimination of private commerce in southern Vietnam, to mid-May, more than fifty thousand Chinese began to flee back to China across the border. China decided to react in May 1978. It publicized the departure en masse of Chinese residents from Vietnam and accused Vietnam of applying “a policy of discrimination, ostracism, and persecution” against the Chinese residents in Vietnam and a plot to “rob” them of their personal property. On May 12, 1978, it announced the cancellation of 21 aid projects in Vietnam to use the money “to make arrangements for the life and work” of the “victimized Chinese residents expelled from Vietnam.” On May 24, the spokesperson of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office declared that the Chinese people “demand” that Vietnam cease “ostracizing, persecuting and expelling Chinese residents …. Otherwise, the Vietnamese Government should bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising from these unwarranted measures.” On May 30, China informed Vietnam that because Hanoi “continues to persecute and expel” Chinese, the PRC was “compelled to cancel” Chinese technical and financial aid to projects under construction in Vietnam, bringing the total number of canceled projects to seventy two. Beijing also prepared for military conflict; it conducted air and naval exercises within fifty miles of the Vietnamese coast and increased air reconnaissance of the Gulf of Tonkin and its military strength along the border. Hanoi, however, signaled its will to resist Chinese use of force. It placed its forces on “nationwide alert”, built up its forces along the Chinese border to five divisions and improved defenses at Haiphong harbor. Both sides, however, kept their main force combat units away from the border to avoid major clash. On June 29, stung by Chinese cancellation of aid projects, Vietnam accepted full membership in the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA; often known as: COMECON). As a result, China proceeded to terminate all assistance and withdrew all Chinese advisors in July, an act which probably set back Vietnamese reconstruction efforts by five years. Apparently, China and Vietnam had become enemies.
What were the real motives behind China’s aggressive acts? Although Hanoi’s treatment of overseas Chinese was unreasonable, at that time there were at least 450,000 overseas Chinese in Cambodia who were subjected to even harsher treatment under the regime of Khmer Rouge. The U.S. Central Intelligence Central Agency estimated that nearly 200,000 Chinese died in Cambodia. China’s different response to the fate of overseas Chinese in Vietnam and those in Cambodia can only be explained in the way that it wanted to punish the Vietnamese for its closeness to the Soviet Union. In fact, Liao Chengzi, Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council charged that “It is the Soviet Union which is encouraging the Vietnamese authorities to behave like this.” China was, however, unsuccessful. The termination of aid projects indeed pushed Vietnam closer to the Soviet Union: the problems of the economy left Vietnam no choice but to strengthen its economic ties with the Soviet bloc, a step that it has long resisted.
The most serious action that Vietnam committed against China’s interest was to escalate its effort to invade the Chinese-backed, anti-Vietnamese Pol Pot government in Cambodia. The case of Cambodia is really complicated, since it did not only involve the interests of China, Cambodia and Vietnam but the Soviet Union as well. In fact, one might venture to suggest that the motives behind China’s decision to attack Vietnam were far more than a mere act of retaliation for its ally. It was deeply rooted in China’s attempt to restrict Soviet’s influence in Indochina.
After the end of the Indochina War in 1975, Moscow continued to expand its influence in Indochina. After Lao Prime Minister and Party General Secretary Kaysone Phomivane had visited Moscow in April 1976, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) leaders promised additional aid and signed trade and payment agreements. In June, the Soviet Union agreed to help Laos build “a city large enough for 15,000 inhabitants,” an airport and offered an interest-free loan of over U.S. $24 million repayable in fifty years. In apparent return for Soviet assistance, the Lao delegation expressed “the Lao’s feeling sincere love for the fraternal Soviet people” and that it is “completely satisfied with the close ties of fraternal friendship and solidarity.” The Soviet Union’s ally, Vietnam was also successful in consolidating relationship with Laos. The two sides signed a number of agreements, in which Vietnam agreed to help build a railroad from Laos to the Vietnamese coast and supplied Laos with food, medicine, consumer goods, technical equipment and other necessary materials. Given the instability in Chinese domestic policy at the time with the death of Zhou Enlai in January and Mao Zedong in September as well as the purge of the “Gang of Four”, Beijing failed to devote itself to Indochina policy and assert its influence over Laos. The Soviet encirclement of the PRC was progressing.
After losing its influence over Laos, Beijing had no other choice but to hold on to Cambodia. In contrast to Laos, Cambodia declared no intention to succumb to any Vietnamese or Soviet domination, asserting that “[o]ur Cambodia is not a satellite of any foreign nation.” For China, Cambodia is the key to restricting the domination of Indochina by Vietnam and, by extension, the Soviet Union. However, although domination over Indochina has been an aim long pursued by the Vietnamese communists, the last thing they wanted was a client relationship with the Soviet Union. An Indochina dominated by Vietnam was in fact no serious problem for China as long as Hanoi maintains a subordinate relationship with China. However, Beijing could not tolerate any signs of Vietnam accepting Soviet influence and support. Ever since the end of the Indochina war, Vietnam had practiced relatively independent policies from the Soviet Union. There was no evidence showing that Vietnam, if given a choice, would choose to become totally dependent on the Soviet Union. When the war ended, Vietnam actively sought to diversify its friendship, and has explored foreign aid from the United States, Japan, and other Western European countries. It also tried to improve its relations with the ASEAN countries. Yet the worsening conditions of its economy and the limited aid from the Western world put Vietnam to a stalemate but to compromise with the Soviet Union. It can be said that China’s obsession with the fear of a Soviet encirclement gave it a false perception of Vietnam which has driven Vietnam into the arms of the Soviet Union”.
In terms of the Vietnamese – Cambodian conflict, this was a result of many factors: traditional hostility, territorial dispute, and ideological differences. Immediately after the end of the Indochina War, on May 4, 1975, Cambodia attacked two islands in Vietnam’s territory and some provinces along the border. On May 25, the Vietnamese army with its overwhelming forces drove back the Cambodians and took over Hon Troc for three months. After that, border skirmishes became more frequent and were gradually intensified by the deliberate actions of the aggressive Khmer Rouge regime. China treated the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia with increasing alarm. Believing that Vietnam is implementing a Russian scheme of encircling China, it started to send military supplies and advisors to Cambodia. During Ieng Sary’s visit to Beijing in late 1978, Chairman Hua Guofeng gave the Cambodian delegation a statement of clear support by declaring that the Chinese people “support your struggle”. However, China refrained from issuing an irrevocable pledge; in fact, Deng Xiaoping later added that China would not send troops to Cambodia. It is suggested that China’s decision not to send troops to Cambodia was due to its apprehension of the Soviet Union. If the fighting in Cambodia intensified and spread to Vietnam, it would be very likely that the Soviets would have reasons to dispatch troops from the north. A full-scale war at the time China was trying to carry out four modernizations would be too risky. Given the geographical location of Cambodia and Vietnam’s influence over Laos, China would also have to rely on Thailand for the transportation of troops and military equipment. Also, the unpopularity of the Khmer Rouge regime greatly reduced the probability of Chinese intervention. China found itself on a dilemma. Beijing did not encourage Pol Pot’s confrontational policy toward Vietnam since doing so might push Vietnam closer to the Soviet Union. In fact, the first Chinese response to the conflict was to attempt mediation. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said it “regretted the conflict,” and hoped it could be settled by negotiation. On the other hand, the fanatically chauvinist Khmer Rouge’s leader Pol Pot, who defined Cambodian nationalism largely in terms of anti-Vietnamese sentiments, made it clear that “anything less than long-term military struggle with Vietnam on the border meant ultimate subordination to the Vietnamese.” The miscalculation and stupidity of the Cambodian regime left Vietnam with no other alternative but to counter attack. Hanoi was, however, aware that China was behind Cambodia’s attack. It charged China with pouring “billions of dollars, huge quantities of weapons, and thousands of military advisors” to shore up the “genocidal fascists” in Cambodia. Finding itself surrounded by Chinese troops along the northern border and Chinese-backed Cambodian troops in the west, Hanoi believed that an offensive against Cambodia was the only solution to its western border crisis. On November 3, 1978, to ensure itself against a probable Chinese attack, Vietnam took a further step by signing a twenty-five year Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union providing consultation in case of being attacked, in this case, clearly by the Chinese. Also on that day, Moscow revealed its full support for Vietnam’s objective of overthrowing Pol Pot and forging a “special relationship” between Hanoi and Phnom Penh. By mid-October 1978, Vietnamese harbors were reportedly filled with Soviet freighters waiting for dock space to unload aircraft, missiles, tanks, and munitions. Assured by the Soviet support, the Vietnamese were now able to launch their offensive against Cambodia. On December 25, about 150,000 Vietnamese troops launched an invasion of Cambodia. The Cambodian army was easily crushed and on January 7, Vietnamese troops entered Phnom Penh. Immediately after that, Hanoi recognized the People’s Republic of Cambodia, which it hailed as the beginning of a new era of cooperation in Indochina. Also, conscious of the importance of international public opinion, Hanoi presented its actions as “legitimate self-defense and as a humanitarian gesture, saving Cambodia from genocide by the Khmer Rouge.”
Although China already predicted the offensive by the Vietnamese, it was still surprised by the sudden fall of Phnom Penh. Almost as soon as the Vietnamese launched their invasion, China began to carry out a military build-up along the Sino-Vietnamese border. Total PLA forces were estimated at about three hundred thousand soldiers, seven hundred to a thousand aircraft, about a thousand tanks, and at least fifteen hundred pieces of heavy artillery. Vietnam also massed its troops along the border and repositioned its aircraft to guard against a possible air strike against Hanoi. On January 30, in his trip to America, Deng Xiaoping denounced Vietnam for its “massive armed aggression” against Cambodia, with the backing of the Soviet Union. Deng stated that he “could not dismiss the possibility of using China’s armed forces against Vietnam … to safeguard China’s security”. The next day, Deng issued his famous “lessons” warning with regard to Vietnam: “If you don’t teach them some necessary lessons, it just won’t do.” However, he added: “Any action taken by the Chinese is through careful consideration.”
The decision to carry out a punitive strike against Vietnam was not taken lightly; it indeed involved a careful process of consideration by Beijing. As Hanoi and Moscow signed the Friendship Treaty, China had little assurance that the Soviet Union would not counter-attack against China should Vietnam and China clash. Moscow and Hanoi’s collaboration during the overseas Chinese crisis and in preparation for Hanoi’s invasion of Cambodia plainly demonstrated their willingness to collaborate militarily to achieve their complementary interest in undermining Chinese influence in Indochina. However, as China and Vietnam moved closer to war after the fall of Phnom Penh, Moscow remained relatively silent. Soviet leaders never commented on the Friendship Treaty, only insisting that “aggressive acts” against Vietnam “are doomed to failure”. Moscow did not make any large deployment of troops along the Sino – Soviet border although it is very unlikely that Soviet leaders did not sense a Chinese punitive attack. Although, the improved U.S. – China relations helped further reduce the likelihood of a Soviet attack. In 1969, when U.S. – China rapprochement had not yet to take place, Washington signaled Moscow that the United States would not be indifferent to Soviet threats against China and would be “deeply concerned” if the Soviet Union should decide to go to war against China. When Deng briefed Carter on the invasion in his January visit to Washington, Carter responded with mild opposition, clearly suggesting that Washington would not condemn the invasion and that U.S. – China relations would not be disturbed. Indeed, when Deng visited the U.S. Congress, many Senators were quite vocal in encouraging him to carry through his threat to teach Vietnam a lesson. To further reduce Soviet motivation for attacking China, the Chinese publicly indicated that their actions against Vietnam would be limited in scope and time. China would not threaten the existence of the Vietnamese regime and would not insist on a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia before withdrawing from Vietnam.
China’s calculations were right, the Soviet Union did not retaliate. However, its leaders made a serious mistake in calculating the military capabilities of two sides. Although there were no big battles, no air war, and no incursion beyond 25 miles from the mountainous border area, China’s casualty rate was very high - at least 20,000 Chinese died in this three-week war. Chinese troops were clearly unprepared for the “lesson” they received from the much more technologically advanced Vietnamese army: in the first attack, the well-dug-in Vietnamese cut down the Chinese troops with machine guns, while mines and booby traps did the rest. Horrified by their losses, the Chinese quickly replaced the general in charge of the invasion and concentrated their attack on neighboring provincial capitals. Using tanks and artillery, they quickly overran most of their desired towns, blew up every building they could and immediately after that began the withdrawal on March 16.
After all, which side learned a bigger lesson? Gerald Segal, in his 1985 book Defending China, concluded that China’s 1979 war against Vietnam was a complete failure:”China failed to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from [Cambodia], failed to end border clashes, failed to cast doubt on the strength of the Soviet power, failed to dispel the image of China as a paper tiger, and failed to draw the United States into an anti-Soviet coalition.” The Vietnamese did not even bother to send in any of the regular army divisions that were then taken up with the occupation of Cambodia. Additionally, Vietnam was not deterred from maintaining its influence over Cambodia, increasing its hold over Laos and threatening the security of Thailand. After China’s invasion of Vietnam, ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, grew more suspicious of China’s ultimate objectives in the region. Moreover, since the war was costly and unsuccessful, China had to re-evaluate its military expenditures under the “four modernizations” and increased them. China may have lost the battle, nevertheless it achieved some political objectives. China’s threat was quite costly for Vietnam, after the invasion, China continued to maintain nine armies in the Vietnamese border region and strengthened its military installations on Hainan island. This threat absorbed most of the Vietnamese defense budget, undermined Hanoi’s effort to modernize its economy, and required continued Vietnamese dependence on the Soviet Union. Consequently, Vietnam’s economic conditions were bad throughout the country. Also, Vietnam was forced to deploy a significant part of its armed force in Cambodia, weakening its ability to maintain its hold in Cambodia and limiting the extent of Vietnamese incursions into Thailand. David Ambrose argued that China was partly successful in showing Vietnam that “its interests could not consistently be flouted with total impunity, and that Vietnam’s Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union had limitations.” Vietnam had defied China too many times – China’s reputation in Asia was on the line. Beijing also warned Moscow that China was “prepared to defend its interests against the Soviet challenge in areas of special sensitivity.”
The Sino – Vietnamese War may have appeared to be a minor conflict, but its impacts were far greater than could have been imagined. As Anne Gilks suggested, the war marked “the end of one era of the Sino – Vietnamese relation and the beginning of another,” as well as the “culmination of the gradual transformation of the Sino – Vietnamese – Soviet romantic triangle,” within which the Sino – Vietnamese alliance has been set, to a Soviet – Vietnamese “stable marriage” against China. The war also greatly affected China’s assessment of the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities and showed that China’s position in the international system remained fragile. After the war, the thrust for military modernization continues to this day, even as the focus of China has shifted from Vietnam back to Taiwan – a “pesky little irritant that could cause Beijing even bigger problems if it decides to administer another lesson”.
Notes
1. Les Buszynski, “Vietnam Confronts China,” Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 8 (Aug., 1980), 829-843. However, only 60,000 – 70,000 were actually engaged in combat.
2. The number of casualties is still in dispute. According to Henry J. Kenny, “Shadow of the Dragon, Vietnam’s continuing struggle with China and the Implications for U.S. Foreign policy,” (Washington D.C: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002), p. 98, the People’s Liberation Army had lost as many as 75,000 men killed or wounded and Vietnam suffered a similar number. However according to Daniel Tretiak, “China’s Vietnam War and Its Consequences,” China Quarterly, No. 80 (Dec., 1979), p. 753, the number of China’s casualties is limited at 20,000, of which more than half were killed in action. If so, in two weeks, China’s forces suffered 25 percent of the deaths of American forces in Vietnam over ten years. Today, most scholars agree with the number of casualties between 20,000 and 40,000.
3. Mainichi Daily News, 8 February 1979, p.1
4. The People Republic of China (PRC) proposed that the two sides, basing themselves on the Sino-French accords, demarcate the border, resolve disputes, and make readjustments in the border in the interests of local inhabitants. After a complete re-demarcation, the two sides would sign a new land border treaty. Hanoi, however, held a different view. It presented a draft agreement providing recognition of the Sino - French accords as the authoritative documents correctly delimiting the frontier and thus eliminated the need for the new treaty that China proposed. Although Vietnam also stipulated that adjustments would be made in the interest of local inhabitants but that such residents would be returned to their home country. This fundamental difference prevented any negotiating progress of both sides whatsoever. For more information, see Robert S. Ross, “The Indochina Tangle, China’s Vietnam Policy 1975-1979,” (New York: Columbia Publisher Press, 1988), p. 152.
5. Ibid., p.203
6. Xinhua, October 26, 1978, FBIS, PRC, October 26, 1979, p. A17
7. Nguyen Manh Hung, “The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors,” Asian Survey, Vol 19, No.11 (Nov., 1979), p. 1040. For more information regarding the land border and South China Sea disputes, see Henry J. Kenny, “Shadow of the Dragon, Vietnam’s continuing struggle with China and the Implications for U.S. Foreign policy,” p. 51-75.
8. Robert S. Ross, “The Indochina Tangle, China’s Vietnam Policy 1975-1979,” (New York: Columbia Publisher Press, 1988), p. 216-217.
9. David Ambrose, “The Conflict between China and Vietnam,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 2 (Jul., 1979), p.116.
10. Nguyen Manh Hung, “The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors,” p.1041.
11. Nguyen Manh Hung, “The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors,” p. 1042.
12. Ibid.
13. Anne Gilks, “The Breakdown of the Sino – Vietnamese Alliance, 1970 – 1979,” (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies – University of California, 1992), p. 193.
14. Nguyen Manh Hung, “The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors,” p.1043.
15. Robert S. Ross, “The Indochina Tangle, China’s Vietnam Policy 1975-1979,” p. 177.
16. Xinhua, May 24, 1978, FPIS, PRC, May 24, 1978, pp. A6-8.
17. Anne Gilks, “The Breakdown of the Sino – Vietnamese Alliance, 1970 – 1979,” p. 204.
18. COMECON is heavily criticized by China. It charged that Moscow used the organization to “reduce the economy of its …. partners to the status of appendage of its own economy” and that the Soviet Union sought to bring the economies of the COMECON countries “under its domination.” See Hsin Ping, “Drawing Together Under Moscow’s Pressure,” Xinhua, November 26, 1977, FBIS, PRC, November 21, 1977, p. A3-5.
19. Phnom Penh Radio, May 5, 1975, in BBC, SWB, FE 4897/A3/10-11 cited in Anne Gilks, “The Breakdown of the Sino – Vietnamese Alliance, 1970 – 1979,” p. 139.
20. Les Buszynski, “Vietnam Confronts China,” p. 832.
21. Sheldon W. Simon, “Peking and Indochina: The Perplexity of Victory,” Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 5 (May 1976), p 401-410.
22. Nguyen Manh Hung, “The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors,” p.1051. Also see note 18 above.
23. Xinhua, July 31, 1978, FBIS, PRC, July 31, 1978, p. A25.
24. Nation Review (Bangkok), October 13, 1978, FBIS, AP, October 13, 1978, p.J1.
25. New York Times, January 19, 1978 cited in Les Buszynski, “Vietnam Confronts China,” Asian Survey, p. 834.
26. Anne Gilks, “The Breakdown of the Sino – Vietnamese Alliance, 1970 – 1979,” p. 173.
27. Nguyen Manh Hung, “The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play among Communist Neighbors,” p.1047.
28. Robert S. Ross, “The Indochina Tangle, China’s Vietnam Policy 1975-1979,” p. 208.
29. Anne Gilks, “The Breakdown of the Sino – Vietnamese Alliance, 1970 – 1979,” p. 225.
30. Ibid., p. 227.
31. New York Times, 31 January 1979, p.1 cited in Daniel Tretiak, “China’s Vietnam War and Its Consequences,” China Quarterly, No. 80 (Dec., 1979), p. 743.
32. Robert S. Ross, “The Indochina Tangle, China’s Vietnam Policy 1975-1979,” p. 227
33. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979). pp. 183-186 cited in Robert S. Ross, “The Indochina Tangle, China’s Vietnam Policy 1975-1979,” , p. 228
34. Ibid.
35. Les Buszynski, “Vietnam Confronts China,” Asian Survey, p. 840.
36. Terry McCarthy, “A Nervous China Invades Vietnam”, TIME, Sep. 27, 1999, Vol. 154, No. 12.
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/99/0927/pingxiang.html
37. Gerald Segal, “Defending China”, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). p. 217.
38. Daniel Tretiak, “China’s Vietnam War and Its Consequences,” p. 756.
39. Ibid. China’s increase in military expenditures in 1979 was nearly 20.5 percent more than the amount allocated in 1978.
40. Anne Gilks, “The Breakdown of the Sino – Vietnamese Alliance, 1970 – 1979,” p. 233.
41. Robert S. Ross, “The Indochina Tangle, China’s Vietnam Policy 1975-1979,” p. 235.
42. David Ambrose, “The Conflict between China and Vietnam,” p.113-114.
43. Anne Gilks, “The Breakdown of the Sino – Vietnamese Alliance, 1970 – 1979,” p. 233.
44. Terry McCarthy, “A Nervous China Invades Vietnam”.
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http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/99/0927/pingxiang.html
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