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Inflation, by its very genuine meaning, is a general increase in prices and fall in the purchasing value of money. As it is not always clear whether an increase in prices would result economically positive, we need deflation-the process of bringing about a general reduction of price levels to serve as a method constraining the pace of inflation. Logically, they coexist to maintain somewhat a balance of an economy.
I would like to begin with the period of 1850-1873, which marked a big turning point in the trend of a 30 years’ fall in prices since the Napoleonic War. Foremost, this period was overwhelmed by many wars and changes in fiscal policies. The Crimean War (1854-1856) had an immediate impact on prices: to finance the war, higher interest rates and income taxes were introduced so as to offset budget deficits. Particularly in England, high prices of provisions raised price level by around 16% in 1854. However, war is a transitory event and so is its impact. In fact, the real inflationary factors were more likely to be traced in the gold discoveries and the railroad boom in the United States as well as many other European countries. Gold expansions (especially in the United States and Australia in 1851) were very striking at time as they reinforced the commitment to gold standard of many governments. Outside Europe, there was a strong development in transport in the United States with the railroad boom being the most prominent one. Railroad mileage tripled between 1840 and 1850, generating a rise in world wheat and cotton prices. A more advanced infrastructure expanded the acreage of wheat as well as cotton and braced the position of the United States as a wheat and cotton exporter. Yet, this inflationary cause was not firmly corroborated. One may argue that the expansion of railroad should drive prices down as it had the power to reduce the cost of transport, enlarged the extent of output and thus cut down the costs of production as a whole. True enough, this major development in transport (considered the leading sector in America growth from 1840s to 1880s) was variably described in many documents, suggesting that it, though very sensitive, was not a crucial inflationary factor those days. In fact, the only obvious inflationary effect of this boom was the necessary capital to be thrown into expanding it. Resources had to be gathered and the price level as well as tax increased consequently. As observed, the decisive factor that ignited inflation was the broad money supply following many gold expansions (world gold output increased at a rate of 8 percent per year from 1851 to 1866). Reasonably, the exceptionally high reserves in many countries (excluding war periods) led to a fall in interest rate and indirectly intensified the whole price level.
On May 9, 1873, world economy witnessed the collapse of the Vienna Stock Exchange (VSE), starting the so-called period of “Long Depression” from 1873 to 1896. To some extent, it is somehow useful to know that the cause of the collapse was mainly due to vast speculation. As with any new expansion, the VSE brought with it an economic boom, dazzling many investors as well as companies. Investment in hope of gain but with a great risk of loss affected price expectations negatively and the wholesale price level, adjusting to falling price expectations, declined thus. Nevertheless, the fundamental causes of this deflationary period (1873-1896) lay in the rapid transition to gold standard in many countries and the extremely high rate of world output. The gold-adopting process proceeded faster than that in 1850s and ran parallel with the demonetisation of silver, creating considerable losses in asset values. Gold output no longer sufficed to catch up with the speedily growing world capacity, though, as aforementioned, many gold expansions were made those days. Shortage of gold, together with the demonetisation of silver (arguably held a significant quantity in coinage) not only established strong currencies (an essential element in deflationary periods) but also impeded trade and constrained economic growth. Moreover, world industry also saw a revolutionary change in industry with the peak being the Second Industrial Revolution. Mass production of consumer goods took place in many countries and led to an overgrowing output, decreasing prices overall. Generally speaking, the weak facilitation of trade (due to the lack of gold and the demonetisation of silver) and the unprecedented increases in productivity were the two underlying deflationary factors with other contributing factors being the waning of railroads as a leading sector in America in the 1890s or the high unemployment rate and new economic shifts.
Any economic analysis from 1896 to 1920 would inevitably point at one prominent incidence: World War I (1914-1918). The influence this event had over world economy was persistent and rigorous: an estimated expenditure of 196 billion dollars (adjusted for 1990 dollar values) was thrown into financing it and unlike many other wars, it left not a transient impact but a permanent one, followed by dramatic changes in politics, geography and society. It should also be noted that the war had long been prepared before it took place, draining a massive amount of capital, which was felt mostly in Britain and Germany (from 1908 to 1913, military expenses within major Great Powers in Europe increased by 50%). Unsurprisingly, the long preparation for the war imposed great burdens on participating countries with economic focuses shifting into sustaining the large sum of arms costs, which led to a decrease in world output and higher tax rates. Expectedly, a high price level, a precondition for investment attraction and the result of changing economic patterns, occurred. Speculation also prevailed in this pre-war era through shortfall in world productivity and the manifestation of the upcoming war and further pushed the price level. Besides, events prior to World War I might also as well play an important role in the movement of price those days. Economic expansions (basically will be followed by inflation) were rapidly made in four central economies with the help of technology. The emergence of electric power in France marked a recovery sign after years of recession and its segment in total industrial production increased from 4.1 percent between 1885-1894 to 11 percent between 1905-1913. Coincidently, the German electrical manufacturing industry was also enjoying a marvellous achievement. “Between 1900 and 1913 Hoffman’s index of German electricity production rises from 12 to 100” and only lagged behind the fledgling automobile industry. In the United States, automobile emerged as the new economic leading sector with “the percentage of value added by automobile, petroleum and rubber industries rose from .99 percent of total value added in manufactures in 1899 to 2.63 percent in 1909”. Britain, however, did not do well in exploiting and incorporating new technologies at time but its industrial pattern of these years was marked by two or more basic characteristics nonetheless (in comparison with its European competitors). All the above expansions, marking the recovery of prices, occurred at a sensitive time when the preparation for the First World War was set in motion. Moreover, very high states of reserve were reported following the gold discovery in the Rand in South Africa in the mid-1890s (principally added to the annual rate of 4.5 percent increase in world gold output). Low interest rate, a feature of high reserves, emerged and in some way contributed to the popular climbing trend of prices at that time. Outside mainland Europe, a surge of immigrants cropped up in the United States with 14 million immigrants between 1896 and 1914. This astounding change in population called for immediate attention in housing and infrastructural demands, thus yielded business expansions. All in all, with the gigantic funds spent and the long preparation for it, World War I overpowered every inflationary factor at that moment and pushed general price level to near the highest rate since the Napoleonic War.
Deflation came about as a matter of course in the period (1920 -1934) between World War I and World War II ensued. No longer did four central powers exist: the German, the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman and the Russian. World economy experienced crises on a wide scale with the First World War consequences being declines in labour force, productivity and the colossal war reparation payments. Perhaps, the severest punishment found itself in Germany with the Versailles Treaty: the payment of 20 000 million marks was to be made immediately and many other assets, including much of the merchant and fishing fleets, gold, raw material were also to be handed over. Identical penalties were also imposed on defeated nations, forcing them to borrow money from other countries. Evidently, the emergence of reparations and the increase in national debt compelled governments to increase taxes and interests on borrowing. Business expenditure rose and businessmen were worse off thus, restraining economic growth. In most respects, there is not much to explain the recession in the postwar period of such major conflict.
Hatred and resentment were the two things left after World War I in Germany and later became some of the causes of World War II (1939-1945). An inflationary atmosphere had been felt for years prior to the war with arms races paving its way. The economic impact of this war was, though essentially identical to that of the First World War, much larger and severer on an intercontinental scale. The expenditure of this ensued war was superior to the first with 2,091 billion dollars in comparison with 196 billion (adjusted for 1990 dollar values). Basically, we can apply the same model of analysis of the First World War here to explain why inflation occurred before and throughout the war. After all, wars are more alike than they are different with the same process of armament and shifting economic focuses into funding them.
“The upward price trend persisted to about 1951-a longer period than after the First World War or after the Napoleonic War”. After the Second World War, two countries became apparent as superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. The 45 years long Cold War between these two superpowers involved with many proxy wars and had a significant economic impact. Together with wars, inflation should also give credit to the appliance of high mass-consumption in many countries. In an attempt to explain the movement of prices in this time period, Phelps Brown and S. A. Ozga adduced numerous evidence to prove that “when industrial capacity tends to grow more quickly than the output of primary products, their prices rise”. In fact, it was the change in demand, not in supply that affected the price level. World population and the global industrialisation process were developing at a record velocity and triggered high pressures of demand on the supply of raw materials and foodstuffs. When Western Europe fully exploited the potentialities of high mass-consumption in the 1950s, the expansion of demand asserted itself in form of rapid increases in welfare, education, travel and recreation. Additionally, when prices were known to be increasing, the risk of a seller to raise prices was relatively small and this attitude towards increasing prices appeared to have lasted throughout the inflationary period until disinflation followed. To put it short, the outgrowing demand and the (intentional) price adjustments paved the way for prices to soar. This timeline also marked the beginning of inflationary as well as deflationary periods with causes other than wars.
Deflation occurred in the mid 1950s and continued until the early 1970s. After 1973, world economy experienced a contrasting trend of prices. “Deeply rooted in the domestic wage-price system of OECD economies”, the inflation of the 1970s was quite entrenched and even expanded into non-OECD countries. Briefly, the causes of this inflation were: increases in oil prices and the ease of money. Between 1970 and 1980, world economy witnessed two shocks in oil prices: in 1973 when oil prices went up to about $12 per barrel and in 1980 when they doubled further to $36 per barrel. These increases in oil prices should be attributed to OPEC with regards to the fact that they were able to control oil prices by limiting productions and there was strong demand for petroleum among OECD countries. Naturally, being one of the most important resources, crude oil and the increase of its prices ultimately pushed the price level in the light of transport costs. Besides, the ease of money was prevalent in major economies, especially in the United States, and further contributed to the already high wholesale prices.
Fortunately, thanks to the outstanding economic policies in the first half of 1980s, significant reductions were brought about with the help from the falling prices of oil and non-oil commodities. The second surge in oil prices (in 1980) compelled OECD governments to adopt a new accommodating policy to prevent high inflation from emerging. True enough, monetary policies within OECD countries were tightened right afterward in an attempt to halt the climbing oil prices and to defend their currencies against the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, as nominal and real interest rates were rising sharply in the United States. But much as monetary policies may have played an important part in constraining oil prices, non-oil commodity played a more important role in constraining the price level as a whole. The turn-round of non-oil commodity prices between 1980 and 1982 significantly contributed to the decline in price level at that moment with minerals and metals prices declining steeply from 1980 to 1982 (considered to be sensitive to demand conditions and inflation expectations). A close relationship between commodity prices and import prices was also established at that time. Admittedly, as the deceleration of commodity prices in non-OECD countries was much more rapid than that in OECD countries and the fact that only 40% of total OECD’s imports of commodities are from other OECD countries, it is no surprise that import prices did play a major part in decreasing prices generally in OECD countries.
From 1983 to 1987, OECD economies grew at a slow pace and deflation continued to take place. This was the case especially in Europe, where real growth reached only 2,5 percent per year in response to high prices in the 1970s. At this point, no longer could OPEC influence oil prices like they did in the 1970s as petroleum demands decreased in correspondence with weak growth and sought cheaper supplies from non-OPEC countries. Besides, the declining non-oil commodity prices, though affected by breakthroughs in technology, were the result of extraordinary economic policies. The rise in agricultural assistance among OECD countries contributed to the vast supplies in world agricultural output, thus deflating prices. Also, throughout the 1980s, OECD countries, in an attempt to improve economic situations, undertook many structural reforms such as removing tax distortion, promoting deregulation and increasing competition. These reforms undoubtedly contributed further to disinflation in light of exposing a more open and competitive market, imposing downward pressures on prices. Evidently, we can see how important economic policies were to disinflation and how essential the decline in commodity prices was to speeding up the process. Altogether, they marked an outstanding achievement of world economy those days.
Although inflation has yet to cease until today, it has been remaining low by historical standards. “Because low and stable inflation is widely regarded as one of the preconditions for sustained economic growth”, it is important that a low-inflation rate be maintained. To put an end, as Sir Frederick Leith-Ross once said, “Inflation is like sin: every government denounces it and every government practises it”.
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